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Abstract 
The business of banks runs on the public faith and their confidence in banks. The confidence level of the public 
can only be developed by proper disclosures and transparency. The good corporate governance practices ensure 
proper interest protection of all the stakeholders. The concept of corporate governance in case of banks differs 
from the corporate governance in other sectors. In banks, corporate governance must be supported by ethical 
leadership. The performance of banks is directly related to their leadership and size of the board. This paper is 
focusing on the level of corporate governance in the selected public sector and private sector banks and its 
impact on the NPA in banks. The problem in question for this paper was the role of corporate governance in 
the effective performance of public and private sector banks. So, this paper investigates the impact of corporate 
governance on the financial performance of banks, for example, on banks’ efficiency to cater to the needs of 
public, innovations regarding product and services and about non-performing assets. The research 
methodology of this paper is based on primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include an 
unstructured interview of the managerial persons of selected banks. The primary data helped in understanding 
the different governance issues and problems in the banking sector. The secondary data is collected from the 
websites of concerned banks. The data collected with the help of primary and secondary data was analyzed 
with the help of statistical tools such as multiple regression model. The bank efficiency was calculated based 
on different factors such as board leadership structure, board composition, and board size. It was observed that 
the performance of any bank is closely related to corporate governance and ethical leadership of banks. It is 
found that among the corporate governance variables, smaller board size and a higher ratio of block ownership 
consistently seem to have better efficiency. However, other corporate governance variables do not have a 
significant and consistent impact on efficiency. There are a few factors, which could explain the weak system 
of corporate governance in India. The effectiveness of independent director provisions would be severely 
compromised in an environment where companies are run by autocratic leaders and in a culture where 
confrontations are generally avoided. However, certain variables related to management may not be measured 
such as ethical values of promoters and top-level management of public and private sector banks. There are 
many such examples in the Indian context and also in the globe. The paper has certain limitations such as all 
the banks in India were not studied so the results may be different when we include all the private and public 
sector banks. Further, it is suggested that the government and RBI as central banks should ensure effective 
governance in banks. The problem of NPA can be resolved by good corporate governance culture in banks.  
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Introduction 
The concept of corporate governance in real terms is to take care of all the stakeholders. The importance of 
corporate governance is more vivid in the banking sector as they are having the hard earn money of public 
deposited with them. The banks have a strong relation and impact on the economic development of any country 
as they provide the funds to corporate for their growth. This growth will provide jobs and earning opportunities 
for the population of those countries. The business of the banks runs on the faith and confidence of the public 
in these institutions. The corporate governance in general meaning is to take care of all the stakeholders of that 
company. However, in the banks, it is beyond the common understanding, which extends the public at large, 
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the government, and other financial institutions. For the success of any bank, it is prerequisite that corporate 
governance must be supported by the ethical leadership as corporate governance can be implemented in the 
true sense by the ethical leadership of banks. The concept of corporate governance in case of banks differs 
from the corporate governance in other sectors but enough research in this area focusing the banks is not 
available. The problem we are discussing in this paper is to understand the role of corporate governance for 
the effective performance of banks. This paper is focusing on the level of corporate governance in selected 
banks and its impact on the NPA in banks. 
The role of corporate governance in banks is more important as if it is not implemented properly then we will 
see the scams like Punjab National Bank (PNB), where one businessman Neerav Modi has taken away Rs. 
11400 Cr. by misusing the SWIFT with the help of bank officials. Alexander (2006) explains that the corporate 
governance of banks is more important than in other industries because the banking sector plays a crucial 
financial intermediary role in any economy, particularly in developing countries. Even recently, RBI has issued 
the advisory to Kotak Mahindra Bank, Yes bank and Bandhan bank to reduce promoters shareholding in order 
to ensure better corporate governance in these banks. Poor corporate governance of the banks can drive the 
market to lose confidence in the ability of a bank to properly manage its assets and liabilities, including 
deposits, which could, in turn, trigger a liquidity crisis and then it might lead to an economic crisis in a country 
and pose a systemic risk to the society at large. The governance of banks is directly related to their performance. 
The governance in banks depends on the various subsets of corporate governance. It starts with top-level 
management for a policy framework and lower level management for effective implementation of corporate 
governance in any bank. In the light of PNB scam, it is important to examine the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms in the banking sector and financial performance and bank efficiency. However, the problem of 
the researcher is that there is no study, which has been done on the impact of corporate governance on bank 
efficiency in the Indian context.  
The performance of the banking system depends on identifying new products and selling them efficiently at a 
competitive price and ensure the protection of customer's interest.  It is also essential for the overall growth of 
the economy since any lack of growth in efficiency will pull down India’s economy. 
Table 1. Gross NPA (in Rs.), Net NPA (in Rs.), Net NPA to Advance (%), EPS, Dividend/Share,               
Net Profit/Share of banks for 2013-2018 
Bank Year 
Gross NPA 
(in Cr.) 
Net NPA (in 
Cr.) 
Net NPA to 
Advances 
(%) 
Diluted 
EPS (Rs.) 
DPS 
 (Rs.) 
Net Profit/Share 
(Rs.) 
AXISBANK  2018 21280.48 8626.6 2 15.34 5 15.36 
AXISBANK 2017 6087.51 2522.14 1 34.4 5 34.51 
AXISBANK 2016 4110.19 1316.71 0 30.85 4.6 31.04 
AXISBANK 2015 3146.41 1024.62 0 132.23 20 132.33 
AXISBANK 2014 2393.42 704.13 0 118.85 18 110.68 
AXISBANK 2013 1806.3 1186.74 0 102.2 16 102.67 
BANKBARODA  2018 42719 18080 5 6 1.2 5.99 
BANKBARODA 2017 40521.04 19046.46 5 -23.89 0 -23.35 
BANKBARODA 2016 16261.44 8069.49 2 15.83 3.2 15.32 
BANKBARODA 2015 11875.9 6034.76 2 107.38 21.5 105.44 
BANKBARODA 2014 7982.58 4192.03 1 108.84 21.5 106.05 
BANKBARODA 2013 4464.75 1543.64 1 127.84 17 121.41 
CANBK  2018 34202.04 21648.98 6 20.63 1 18.78 
CANBK 2017 31637.83 20832.91 6 -53.61 0 -51.8 
CANBK 2016 13039.96 8740.09 3 58.59 10.5 56.87 
CANBK 2015 7570.21 5965.46 2 54.48 11 52.86 
CANBK 2014 6260.16 5278.07 2 64.83 13 64.83 
CANBK 2013 4031.75 3386.31 1 74.1 11 74.1 
FEDERALBNK  2018 1727.05 941.2 1 4.76 0.9 4.82 
FEDERALBNK 2017 1667.77 950.01 2 2.75 0.7 2.77 
FEDERALBNK 2016 1057.73 373.27 1 11.75 2.2 11.74 
FEDERALBNK 2015 1087.41 321.56 1 9.81 2 9.81 
FEDERALBNK 2014 1554.01 431.94 1 49 9 49 
FEDERALBNK 2013 1300.83 199 1 45.41 9 45.41 
HDFCBANK  2018 5885.66 1843.99 0 56.43 11 56.78 
HDFCBANK 2017 4392.83 1320.37 0 48.26 9.5 48.64 
HDFCBANK 2016 3438.38 896.28 0 41.67 8 40.76 
HDFCBANK 2015 2989.28 820.03 0 35.21 6.85 35.34 
HDFCBANK 2014 2334.64 468.95 0 28.18 5.5 28.27 
HDFCBANK 2013 1999.39 352.33 0 21.91 4.3 22.02 
ICICIBANK  2018 42159.38 25216.81 5 16.77 2.5 16.82 
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Table 1 (cont.). Gross NPA (in Rs.), Net NPA (in Rs.), Net NPA to Advance (%), EPS, Dividend/Share,    
Net Profit/Share of banks for 2013-2018 
ICICIBANK 2017 26221.25 12963.08 3 16.65 5 16.72 
ICICIBANK 2016 15094.69 6255.53 2 19.13 5 19.27 
ICICIBANK 2015 10505.84 3297.96 1 84.65 23 84.94 
ICICIBANK 2014 9607.75 2230.56 1 71.93 20 72.17 
ICICIBANK 2013 9475.33 1860.84 1 55.95 16.5 56.08 
IDFCBANK  2018 1542.1 576.47 1 2.98 0.75 3 
IDFCBANK 2017 3058.3 1139.04 2 2.34 0.25 1.38 
IDFCBANK 2016 NA NA NA -1164.79 0 -516.98 
INDUSINDBK  2018 1054.87 438.9 0 47.56 6 47.95 
INDUSINDBK 2017 776.82 321.75 0 39.26 4.5 38.43 
INDUSINDBK 2016 562.92 210.48 0 33.41 4 33.88 
INDUSINDBK 2015 620.79 184.05 0 26.41 3.5 26.79 
INDUSINDBK 2014 457.78 136.76 0 21.4 3 20.3 
INDUSINDBK 2013 347.08 94.67 0 16.86 2.2 17.16 
KOTAKBANK  2018 3578.6 1718.1 1 18.55 0.6 18.53 
KOTAKBANK 2017 2838.11 1261.96 1 11.4 0.5 11.39 
KOTAKBANK 2016 1237.23 609.08 1 24.14 0.9 24.16 
KOTAKBANK 2015 1059.44 573.56 1 19.59 0.8 19.51 
KOTAKBANK 2014 758.11 311.41 1 18.24 0.7 18.23 
KOTAKBANK 2013 614.19 237.38 1 14.61 0.6 14.65 
PNB  2018 55370.45 32702.1 8 6.45 0 6.23 
PNB 2017 55818.33 35422.56 9 -20.82 0 -20.24 
PNB 2016 25694.86 15396.5 4 16.91 3.3 16.51 
PNB 2015 18880.06 9916.99 3 93.91 10 92.32 
PNB 2014 13465.79 7236.5 2 139.52 27 134.31 
PNB 2013 8719.62 4454.23 2 154.02 22 144 
SBIN  2018 112342.99 58277.38 4 13.43 2.6 13.15 
SBIN 2017 98172.8 55807.02 4 12.98 2.6 12.82 
SBIN 2016 56725 0 2 18 3.5 17.55 
SBIN 2015 61605 0 3 156.76 30 145.88 
SBIN 2014 51189.39 21956.48 2 210.06 41.5 206.2 
SBIN 2013 39676.46 15818.85 2 184.31 35 174.46 
YesBANK  2018 2018.56 1072.27 1 76.77 12 72.95 
YesBANK 2017 748.98 284.47 0 59.31 10 60.39 
YesBANK 2016 313.4 0 0 48.01 9 48.01 
YesBANK 2015 174.93 26.07 0 44.35 8 44.86 
YesBANK 2014 94.32 6.99 0 35.55 6 36.27 
YesBANK 2013 83.86 17.46 0 27.13 4 27.68 
Source: www.moneycontrol.com 
The Indian banking system is a combination of large and small banks and the customers are also divided in to 
various categories based on their needs. Banks are engaged in mobilizing resources for the purpose of lending 
to foster growth and development. The Indian banking system consists of 27 public sector banks, 26 private 
sector banks, 46 foreign banks, 56 regional rural banks, 1,574 urban cooperative banks and 93,913 rural 
cooperative banks, in addition to cooperative credit institutions. Public-sector banks control more than 70 per 
cent of the banking system assets, thereby leaving a comparatively smaller share for its private peers. Banks 
are also encouraging their customers to manage their finances using mobile phones. In all banks, gross NPA 
(%) is increasing in comparison with the last year’s except Federal bank, HDFC Bank, IDFC Bank, 
IndusInd Bank and Yes Bank. Bank of Baroda, ICICI Bank, PNB, SBI banks have the highest level of 
NPAs. These banks, which are in high level of NPA, are contributing 1/3rd portion to the total. Although various 
measures have been taken to address this issue with the IBC being the latest one where some of the larger 
NPAs have been identified for speedy resolution. In all banks, Net NPA (%) is increasing in comparison with 
the last year’s except Federal bank, HDFC Bank, IDFC Bank, IndusInd Bank, Kotak Bank, Yes Bank. 
EPS of HDFC Bank, IndusInd Bank, Yes Bank, are increasing year on year basis. Dividend/Share of HDFC 
Bank, IndusInd Bank, Yes Bank are increasing year on year basis. Net Profit/Share of HDFC Bank, 
IndusInd Bank, Yes Bank are increasing year on year basis. IDFC Bank also has incremental EPS, 
Dividend/Share and Net profit/Share. It can be said that the governance is a heart of any company, especially 
in the banking sector and looking the bank performance from efficiency aspect. Hence, the aim of this paper 
is to investigate the impact of corporate governance on financial performance of banks for example, on banks 
efficiency to cater the needs of public, innovations regarding product and services and about non-performing assets. 
Theoretical Framework 
The main theoretical assumption of this research is based on the agency framework. Agency theory argues for 
a clear separation of the responsibilities of the CEO and the chairman of the board and seems to prefer to have 
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separate leadership structure because the day-to-day management of the company is led by the CEO, the 
chairman of the board needs to monitor the decisions made by the CEO which will be implemented by the 
management and to oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating and compensating the CEO (Brickley et 
al., 1997; Weir, 1997). If both are the same person, there would be no one to monitor his or her actions. It will 
be detrimental to the interest of all the stakeholders. The board composition is very important to effectively 
monitor the managers and reduce the agency cost. Although the executive directors have specialized skills, 
expertise and valuable knowledge of the firms’ operating policies and day-to-day activities, there is a need for 
the independent directors to contribute the fresh ideas, independence, objectivity, and expertise gained in their 
own fields (Weir, 1997).  
Jensen (1983) explained that boards with more than seven or eight members are unlikely to be effective. They 
elaborate that large boards result in less effective coordination, communication, and decision-making, and are 
more likely controlled by the CEO. Corporate governance could be viewed from three different perspectives; 
(a) managerial ownership, (b) block ownership, and (c) institutional ownership. Seifert et al. (2005), Le et al. 
(2006), Langnan, Steven and Weibin (2007) and Ramzi (2008) collectively agree on the important role of 
institutional shareholders in the monitoring of firms because of the following reasons; (a) institutional 
shareholders normally own a substantial number of shares, (b) the potential benefits from their activism is 
large enough to be worth their effort, (c) they have less ability than individual shareholders to liquidate the 
shares without affecting the share price, (d) substantial influence on the management, (e) they seem to have a 
fiduciary responsibility towards the ultimate owners, and (f) they have the ability to monitor executives since 
they are professionals. 
Research Methodology and Model 
Recent literature on corporate governance has tried to study its impact on the financial performance of banks, 
for example, on banks’ efficiency. Jain and Thomson (2008) found that poor governance leads to poor financial 
performance. The following hypotheses will relate corporate governance and ownership variables with the 
financial performance of banks, in term of its efficiency.  
Ha1: Bank efficiency is positively related to a separate leadership structure. 
Ha2: Bank efficiency is positively related to a higher proportion of independent directors. 
Ha3: Bank efficiency is negatively related to a board size. 
Ha4: Bank efficiency is positively related to a higher proportion of director ownership, a higher proportion of 
block ownership and a higher proportion of institutional ownership. 
The research methodology for this paper is primary and secondary both. The primary data was collected with 
the help of unstructured interview of the managerial persons at the concerned banks and secondary data is 
collected from the final accounts of the concerned banks. The data is analyzed with the tables and other 
statistical tools. 
Empirical Model and Sample Selection 
In this section, the empirical model of the study will be presented. The dependent variable is the efficiency of 
the banks, which is measured using two proxies; the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL_TL) 
and the ratio of operating expenses to total assets (OPEXP_TA). There are six independent variables, which 
comprise of three conventional measures of corporate governance (i.e. board leadership structure, board 
composition, and board size) and three measures of ownership structure (i.e. director ownership, institutional 
ownership, and block ownership). Finally, the empirical model of the study also includes four control variables; 
two control variables related to firm-specific characteristics (i.e. firm size and leverage), and two control 
variables related to economic environment (i.e. gross domestic product rate and economic crisis). The complete 
empirical model is as follows: 
EFFICIENCY = βo + β1 BLS+β2 INE_BZ +β3 BZ +β4 DOWN+β5 IOWN+β6 BOWN+β7 LNTA+β8 TD_TE+β9 GDP 
RATEx9i +β10 DUM_CRISIS +εit                                                                                                                                                                                            (1) 
Where:  
EFFICIENCY = Performance is measured using two proxies; namely, the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans and ratio of operating expenses to total assets; 
BLS = Board leadership structure, where 1 = separate leadership structure, and 0 = combined leadership 
structure; 
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INE_BZ = Proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board; 
BZ = Board size; 
DOWN = Proportion of director ownership; 
IOWN = Proportion of institutional ownership; 
BOWN = Proportion of block ownership;  
LNTA = Firm size, measured by Log of total assets;  
TD_TE = Leverage, measured by total assets over total equity; 
GDP RATE = Gross domestic product growth rate; 
DUM_CRISIS = Dummy variable for economic crisis years, where 1 = crisis year, 0 = non-crisis year. 
The sample includes the twelve listed banking companies since there are only twelve listed banks in India. 
Sample data have been collected from 2012 until 2018 because Indian Code on Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) was introduced in 2001 and data collection period is five years before and after introducing MCCG 
(2001). The total number of observations is 120 observations. However, some of the observations need to be 
dropped due to unavailability of data and some companies were not classified as banks in all the ten years’ 
period. It left the final observations to 108 observations. Data were collected either from the annual reports of 
the companies or from Bloomberg. The statistical method used in this study is a panel data analysis (generalized 
least square method). The generalized least square method is used because the sample data are not normally 
distributed and the data have either heteroskedasticity problem, autocorrelation problem or both of them. 
According to Gujarati (2003), the usage of a generalized least square method will overcome all these problems.  
Data Analysis 
Under this section, the descriptive statistics will be explained first. It will be followed by the discussions on 
the GLS multivariate regression results on the relationship between bank efficiency and corporate governance 
variables. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study.  In case of board leadership 
structure, its mean value (0.81) shows that a majority of the companies have separate leadership structure 
although the minimum value (zero) shows that there are companies, which have combined leadership structure. 
Similar to the recommendation of the MCCG (2001), the sample mean value (0.36) shows that the ratio of 
independent directors is slightly more than one-third of the total number of the directors. The mean value 
(8.23) of board size shows the existence of quite a reasonable board size, e.g. Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest 
that a board size of not more than 7 or 8 members is considered reasonable in ensuring effectiveness. For 
ownership, the mean values of director ownership and institutional ownership are 0.02 and 0.17 respectively. 
The ownership of shares by directors can be considered very low where, on average, only 2 percent of shares 
owned by the directors. On the other hand, institutional investors, on average, owned 17 percent of shares 
which could still be considered low although it is significantly higher than the ownership by the directors. In 
the case of block ownership, its mean value (0.53) shows that the significant portion of the shares is owned by 
large shareholders. The mean values of dependent variables are: for the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans (11.19) and the ratio of operating expenses to total assets (0.02). As for the firm-specific characteristics, 
the sample companies have the mean values of RM45992.19 millions for total assets and 344.73 for the ratio 
of total debt to total equity. Finally, the average GDP rate is 8 percent per annum.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Results 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Median 
CG variables     
BLS 0.81 0.40 0.00 1.00 
INE_BZ 0.36 0.18 0.10 0.33 
BZ 8.23 2.34 4.00 8.00 
(b) Ownership variables     
DOWN 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 
IOWN 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.09 
BOWN 0.53 0.21 0.00 0.58 
(c) Efficiency variables     
NPL_TL 11.19 12.09 0.00 9.18 
OPEXP_TA 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 
(d) Control variables     
TA 45992.19 40245.92 1120.36 33326.95 
TD_TE 344.73 331.14 14.03 223.80 
GDP RATE 0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.09 
Source: Researcher output 
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GLS Results 
Efficiency is measured by two proxies, namely, ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and ratio of 
operating expenses to total assets. The findings for each will be explained in the following paragraphs. 
The Ratio of Non-performing Loans to Total Loans as a Proxy of Efficiency 
Table 3 shows the GLS results for the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (i.e. NPL_TL). With regard 
to the corporate governance variables, only board size has a significant effect on banks’ efficiency (at p<0.01). 
The higher the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, the lower will be the banks’ efficiency. Therefore, 
a significant positive relationship between the board size and the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
means that a smaller board size influences better banks’ efficiency. As for the ownership variables, higher 
ownership by the directors (i.e. DOWN) and more concentrated ownership (i.e. BOWN) lead to better banks’ 
efficiency. The results could suggest that as directors own more shares of the company, the interests of 
shareholders are better aligned to the firms’ interests. The significance of concentrated ownership could 
suggest better monitoring by the block holders. Finally, with regard to the control variables, bigger banks, 
better economic environment and financial crisis period lead to better banks’ efficiency. 
Table 3. GLS results of the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
 Coefficient Z Statistics P value 
Independent variables    
BLS 0.17 0.12 0.90 
INE_BZ 5.16 1.25 0.21 
BZ 0.81 2.6* 0.01 
DOWN -39.89 -4.13* 0.00 
IOWN -5.05 -1.62 0.11 
BOWN -7.23 -2.41** 0.02 
Control variables    
LNTA -2.16 -2.41** 0.02 
TD_TE 0.00 -0.19 0.85 
GDP RATE -32.09 -4.6* 0.00 
DUM_CRISIS -2.96 -2.6* 0.01 
CONS 32.24 4.33* 0.00 
Chi2   71.17* 
P value   0 
Heteroskedastic LR Chi2   158.31* 
(LR Test) P value   0 
Autocorrelation F statistics   2361.29* 
(Wooldridge Test) P value   0 
* Significant at 1%   
** Significant at 5%   
Source: Researcher output 
The Ratio of Operating Expenses to Total Assets as a Proxy of Efficiency 
Table 4 shows the GLS results for the ratio operating expenses to total assets (i.e. OPEXP_TA) which is the 
second proxy for efficiency.  Overall, the GLS results of the second proxy of efficiency (i.e. OPEXP_TA) are 
much weaker as the Chi2 value is much lower (i.e. 29.58) than the GLS results of NPL_TL (Chi2 of 71.17). 
Consistent with the results in Table 3, board size is still found to be significant (at p<0.10). Institutional 
ownership (i.e. IOWN) is also found to be significant; however, the sign of relationship contradicts theoretical 
expectation. As for the control variables, only firm size is found to be significant. 
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Table 4. GLS results of the ratio of operating expenses to total assets 
 Coefficient Z Statistics P value 
Independent variables    
BLS 0.00 0.02 0.99 
INE_BZ 0.00 0.17 0.86 
BZ 0.00 1.66 0.10 
DOWN 0.00 0.09 0.93 
IOWN 0.01 3.41* 0.00 
BOWN 0.00 -1.45 0.15 
Control variables    
LNTA 0.00 -2.50* 0.01 
TD_TE 0.00 -0.16 0.87 
GDP RATE 0.00 -0.45 0.65 
DUM_CRISIS 0.00 0.59 0.56 
CONS 0.03 5.35* 0.00 
Chi2   29.58* 
P value   0.00 
Heteroskedastic LR Chi2   80.30* 
(LR Test) P value   0 
Autocorrelation F statistics   25.41* 
(Wooldridge Test) P value   0.00 
* Significant at 1%     
** Significant at 5%   
Source: Researcher output 
Based on the GLS results of the two proxies of banks’ efficiency, many conventional corporate governance 
and ownership structure variables, based on the agency framework, were found to be insignificant. Although 
agency theory represents an attractive platform for structuring corporate governance systems, the 
generalizability of such theory is seems rather restrictive. This theory seems to be Anglo-American centric, 
grounded in capitalistic theory (Mccarthy & Puffer, 2008) and insensitive to non-economic forces that drive 
managerial choices in mixed (socialist/ capitalist) economies. Hence, it could be concluded that corporate 
governance systems are not converging and (Yoshikawa & Phan, 2003) so local laws and local business 
environment might influence the governance system in its own country (Seifert et al., 2005). Furthermore, the 
agency theory focuses on the conflict between directors and owners but not between the majority and minority 
of shareholders. In India, the later conflict is the major problem and hence the applicability of agency theory 
in the Indian context is rather limited. 
Conclusions 
It is observed that the corporate governance plays a significant role in the performance of any bank and protects 
the interest of all stakeholders. The level of NPA and corporate governance is closely related to each other. 
The findings of this study have important implication for banks in India. It is found that among the corporate 
governance variables, a smaller board size and a higher ratio of block ownership consistently seem to have 
better efficiency. It is found that HDFC, ICICI scoring high in corporate governance. However, the rest of the 
corporate governance variables do not seem to have a significant and consistent impact on efficiency. There 
are a few factors, which could explain the weak system of corporate governance in India. The effectiveness of 
independent director provisions would be severely compromised in an environment where companies are run 
by autocratic leaders and in a culture where confrontations are generally avoided. Hence, a Western-style board 
may not work well within Indian culture. Further, it says that Good corporate governance seeks to achieve a 
balance between business and ethics, which means the process of achieving the business goals, has to be ethical 
and fair on all fronts. SBI failed to find a place among the top 10 companies in any of the eight parameters. It 
is true that the ‘corporate governance’ has no unique structure or design and is largely considered ambiguous. 
There is still lack of awareness about its various issues, like, social responsibility, business ethics, quality and 
frequency of financial and managerial disclosure, compliance with the code of best practice, roles and 
responsibilities of the Board of Directories, shareholders rights, etc. There have been many instances of failure 
and scams in the corporate sector, like collusion between companies and their accounting firms, the presence 
of weak or ineffective internal audits, lack of required skills by managers, lack of proper disclosures, non-
compliance with standards, etc. As a result, both management and auditors have come under greater scrutiny.  
The implementation of corporate governance norms in Indian banks has been phenomenal after the bank 
reforms were put in place. With the initial framework of the Ganguly committee, there has been a consistent 
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focus on ‘fit and proper’ standards. The PSBs have even begun to rate their corporate governance standards 
from rating agencies. Banks have been working on the sustainability of corporate governance standards and 
have begun to realize the importance of corporate social responsibility, which is an integral part of it. The 
multiplicity of regulators, issues in the appointment of rightly qualified Board members and conflict of interest 
between the long term and short-term objectives always pose bigger challenges. Thus, it is recommended that 
regulatory authorities should make the rules for the effective implementation of corporate governance in the 
banks. It is also suggested that banks should develop a good corporate culture for effective implantation of 
corporate governance in banks. 
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